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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Heather MacGregor Bothwell 
for the Master of Science in Political Science, presented 
July 10, 1995. 
Title: Gaining State Response on Global Environmental Problem-
Solving: Developing A State-Centric Approach 
This study focuses on identifying the conditions 
which encourage or discourage international cooperation 
with regard to environmental problem-solving. In 
particular, the divergence between two key international 
relations theories, Environmentalism and Realism, will be 
examined in hopes of forging a rapprochement and 
stimulating research for a comprehensive theoretical 
approach to global environmental problem-solving. It is 
hypothesized that a state-centric political system is both 
a reality and an effective structure for environmental 
problem-solving, therefore an examination of state 
participation and the motivators and inhibitors affecting 
2 
state response on certain environmental issues is 
conducted. In particular, this study hypothesizes that 
uncertainty can act as an inhibitor, and without the 
introduction of motivators can prevent states from 
participating in environmental problem-solving. A 
conceptual model of state courses of action is utilized to 
illustrate the potential of state participation and the 
development of a state-centric approach. 
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM-SOLVING AND ITS APPROACHES 
INTRODUCTION: 
In February, 1970, the largest class in the history of 
the Oregon State System of Higher Education started up at 
the University of Oregon. Called "Can Man Survive?," the 
environmental concerns class drew some 2500 students and 
had to be held in McArthur court, the huge indoor field 
house, because it was the only facility that could begin 
to accommodate that large a group. 
Through the leadership of catalytic groups like the "Can 
Man Survive?" class, Environmentalism became a viable 
force not only in Oregon but across the United States and 
in many other countries throughout the world. And in the 
past twenty-five years, despite some political 
setbacks, the water and air supplies of many nations have 
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improved, while recycling has become a major industry 
worldwide. Such significant national improvements have 
stimulated some attempts at international cooperation, but 
here the record is erratic; to date there have been only 
a few successful efforts at international cooperation on 
global-level environmental problems. 
What is it about the approach of Environmentalism that 
has led to some notable successes in domestic 
environmental problem solving but has mostly failed to 
generate effective international cooperation in the 
environmental arena? Is there something about the 
philosophy itself that is antithetical to cooperative 
efforts among nation-states? This study is focused on 
identifying some of the reasons for the relative lack of 
international cooperation on environmental problems, and 
also on presenting some ideas which might help stimulate 
greater cooperative efforts in the future. 
In particular, the divergence between two key 
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international relations theories, Environmentalism and 
Realism, will be examined for their differences and a plan 
for harmonizing the two will be detailed through 
development of an environmental problem-solving approach 
which combines the appeals of Environmentalists and the 
state-centric political structure most accurately 
described by Realists. It is hoped that this examination 
will help forge a rapprochement between the two schools 
and stimulate research for a comprehensive theoretical 
approach to global environmental problem-solving. 
This study further focuses on identifying the conditions 
which encourage or discourage international cooperation 
with regard to environmental problem-solving. This paper 
seeks to refute the argument that states are remiss in 
addressing environmental problems. Rather, it would 
appear that states are likely to act on environmental 
issues where certain conditions are present 
("motivators"), and when certain obstacles ("inhibitors") 
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are removed. Specifically, this study hypothesizes that 
uncertainty can act as inhibitor in environmental problem-
solving and can manifest itself in three important areas: 
scientific bases, economic outcomes and political 
outcomes. Thus, without the introduction of motivators, 
uncertainty can prevent states from performing a rational 
cost-benefit analysis in favor of participating in 
environmental problem-solving. Accordingly, this 
paper will examine state participation in general and 
identify five principal types of state responses to 
environmental problems which are presented in relation to 
levels of uncertainty. Following this discussion a 
conceptual model will be utilized to correlate the effects 
of the introduction of motivators and inhibitors with the 
typology of state responses. This study postulates that 
these so-called motivators and inhibitors are not static 
factors, but can be employed dynamically to either 
encourage or discourage state participation. Therefore, 
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in the final section two case studies will be presented to 
illustrate the possibilities of employing the model in a 
state-centric approach to environmental problem-solving. 
It is hoped that the analysis will contribute to both an 
understanding of and possible development of a state-
centric approach to re-solving environmental problems. 
The need for global environmental problem-solving 
techniques is increasing. With the end of the Cold War, 
much of the focus on military security has shifted to 
other areas, including the environment. However, despite 
an evolving concern over environmental degradation, the 
chasm between awareness and political action is growing. 
This inertia has generated considerable criticism, which 
asserts that current political structures are inadequate 
to attempt environmental problem-solving. However, while 
such criticism may be justified, given states' apparent 
inaction on certain environmental issues, it is premature. 
To date there have been few attempts to address 
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environmental issues utilizing current political 
structures. Rather, there continues to be a lack of 
inquiry into effective methods for achieving solutions to 
environmental concerns. Attempts to forge connections 
between problems and policies, structures and solutions, 
and actors and attitudes have been consistently 
inadequate. 
In traditional areas of policymaking such as national 
security, there exists an extensive discourse on 
international relations theories which argue the pros and 
cons of various approaches to contemporary concerns. Most 
notably, since World War II various types of Realists1 have 
been represented as the dominant voice in this discussion. 
Recently, however, there has been a resurgence of 
Idealist 2 tenets, and increased discussion of the role of 
alternative ideologies in the arena of international 
politics. 
Despite a considerable amount of scholarly discussion 
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regarding specific environmental concerns, though, there 
is a distinct lack of literature regarding international 
relations theory in environmental policymaking. Given the 
dominance of Realism in addressing more conventional 
areas, it is particularly surprising to have a paucity of 
Realist discussion over this key concern. It is 
especially significant, given the state-centric focus of 
Realism, that state-centric discussions of environmental 
policymaking are absent. Further, although the shortage 
of Realist-based environmental discussions has spurred 
Idealist censure, Idealists have not offered much in the 
way of alternative policymaking discussions, except 
approaches which ignore current political structures. 
We are faced then with a somewhat unusual situation, in 
which Environmentalism has been a growing force for 25 
years, and numerous nation-states have been confronting 
and resolving environmental problems for the same time 
period, and yet no substantial body of Environmentalist 
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policymaking literature has evolved in concert with these 
other developments. Because the increased concern over 
the environment has not engendered a comprehensive 
theoretical discussion and the success of environmental 
problem-solving remains sporadic, varying from issue to 
issue, this study seeks to initiate a dialogue over 
approaches to environmental problem-solving in hopes of 
generating further research. Therefore, this paper 
examines the divergence between existent environmental 
concerns and nation-state responses to those problems, and 
asks how to develop effective environmental problem-
solving techniques. Where development of problem-solving 
strategies is the goal, this analysis further seeks to 
harmonize the current approaches to environmental problem-
sol ving with the policy-making needs of states. 
Because this paper also hypothesizes that a state-
centric political system is both a reality and an 
effective structure for solving environmental problems, it 
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is believed that any comprehensive attempt to address 
environmental problem-solving must include a discussion of 
current political structures, notably the role of the 
state, in its analysis. Therefore, this paper ultimately 
seeks to position environmental problem-solving within a 
state-centric approach, thus placing the arguments of 
Environmentalists within the context of Political Realism. 
In this way, it is hoped that further research into 
environmental problem-solving will produce greater 
incidences of state response and more substantial results 
from those responses. 
THE ENVIRONMENTALIST APPROACH 
The development of environmental awareness can be viewed 
as the first step in a process which can lead to global 
environmental problem-solving. This is largely because, 
although it may be widely unrecognized by its advocates, 
Bothwell, 10 
Environmentalism has gone from coffee shop talk to 
prominent political argument. Therefore, the history of 
Environmentalism is also the history of incremental state 
awareness and the beginning of state consideration of 
Environmentalist claims. Environmentalism is the 
challenge of Idealism applied to environmental concerns. 
In particular, it advocates placing the needs of the 
environment above the short-term needs of the human 
population. As such, Environmentalism "challenges certain 
features of almost every aspect of the Western democratic 
capitalist culture its motives, its aspirations, its 
institutions, its performance, and some of its 
achievements." 3 Environmentalism is the outgrowth of the 
conservationist movement that began in the late nineteenth 
century and was associated with Transcendentalism. 4 
Although ecology was influential in the development of the 
conservation movement, ecological awareness was missing 
from the public consciousness until after the 1950s. 5 
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Politically activated in the 1960s, Environmentalism was 
fueled by accounts of widespread industrial pollution, and 
became known as the ecology movement. 6 In 1962, 
Environmentalism gained support through public awareness 
of environmental issues. The publication that year of 
Silent Spring by Rachel Carson brought about far-reaching 
recognition of the ecological movement, and became the 
hallmark of modern Environmentalism. 7 Finally, the 
application of philosophy to Environmentalism brought 
about its maturation into a contemplative perspective that 
moved beyond the limited inquiry of social activism and 
technical management discussions. 8 
Two definite and divergent branches of Environmentalism 
developed from the association of philosophy to ecological 
thought: Ecocentrism9 and Technocentrism. 10 Technocentrism 
places faith in technology to solve environmental 
problems, and therefore, advocates a scientific 
revolution. Ecocentrism is more radical; it rejects the 
Bothwell, 12 
Technocentric nature of conservationist approaches which 
seek to save natural resources for economic gain. In 
opposition to that valuation of environmental assets, 
Ecocentrism attempts to define a bio-centric view which 
values nature for its own sake. As such, Ecocentrism is 
most closely linked to the Transcendentalist tenets of a 
bioethic11 • Ecocentrism is also known by some 
Environmentalists as Deep Ecology . 12 Deep Ecologists 
adhere to a philosophy that begins with the world in a 
state of crisis where shared values in a more earth-
friendly way of life lead to a better lifestyle. 
Specifically, Deep Ecology rejects the anthropocentric 
view of the world inherited by other dominant ideologies, 
e.g. capitalism . 13 The publication of Limits to Growth14 
in 1972 is an excellent example of the Ecocentric 
approach. 
Environmentalism is inherently opposed to a Realist 
theory of international relations, i.e. "a state-centric 
Bothwell, 13 
tradition which accepts a world divided into independent 
sovereign states as being the normal if not permanent 
condition of international society. " 15 Environmentalist 
perspectives argue that the state remains a serious 
obstacle to environmental problem-solving, because it 
hinders the realization of a comprehensive global 
approach. Instead, Environmentalism holds that 
international institutions must accept collective 
responsibility for decision-making regarding global 
concerns such as: military security, economic well-being, 
human rights issues and, of course, environmental 
protect ion. 16 This transnational viewpoint rejects the 
notion that "traditional security thinking and political 
Realism, "which are based on ideas of sovereignty and 
territory, can adequately address the needs of the 
environmental security threat. 17 Therefore, 
Environmentalists believe global solutions are "unlikely 
products of states acting alone, or in cooperation with 
Bothwell, 14 
one another. " 18 Many Environmentalists indicate that states 
represent inappropriate entities for resolution of 
environmental problems, 19 premising this theory on two 
counts: first, states are considered to be self-interested 
bodies; 20 second, state boundaries are not a useful 
demarcation of environmental issues. 21 
In his famous essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 
Garrett Hardin contends that avoidance of the impending 
tragedy of humanity requires mutual coercion to limit 
freedom. 22 From Hardin, one of the first principles of 
Environmentalism was constructed, the view that the earth 
must be considered as a whole or commons. 23 This 
Environmentalist argument is embedded in the purported 
existence of an interdependent relationship, one between 
human beings and the environment; this relationship must, 
according to Environmentalists, be addressed by political 
and social systems and is the cornerstone of the 
Environmentalist approach to problem-solving. 24 Therefore, 
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most Environmentalist perspectives contend there is a need 
for new diplomacy and for new institutions and regulatory 
regimes to cope with the world's growing environmental 
interdependence, a phenomenon where the environmental 
problems of one state af feet all others. 25 Therefore, 
"the accepted definition of the limits of national 
sovereignty as coinciding with national borders is 
obsolete." 26 Further, because the state is seen by 
Environmentalists as inherently inadequate to address 
environmental dilemmas, their perception implies that 
ecological peril is one of several macro-political trends 
which has "chipped away the state's supremacy." 27 
Environmentalists also have adopted interdependence 
theory as a political construct for their approach. 
Political interdependence theory asserts that today's 
relationships among nations reflect a greater 
interconnectedness and a common reliance upon each other's 
actions, a development due largely to increased 
Bothwell, 16 
interactions among states and members of states. 28 Many 
types of political theorists conclude that relationships 
among states exist on many levels: those among 
governments, those among corporations, those among non-
governmental organizations, and those among individual 
citizens. 29 However, Environmentalists appreciate the value 
and connection of other-than-governmental relationships 
far above those of state. Environmental interdependence 
theory attests: as states interact more frequently, the 
importance of other associations increases. 30 Accordingly, 
Environmentalists contend that a natural systemic 
evolution is occurring, which dictates that the present 
structure of governmental relationships will become less 
and less significant in the international system. 31 
Since one Environmentalist assumption holds that the 
nation-state is ineffective in the environmental problem-
solving process, their formula for the future will 
necessitate an alternative systemic construction. 
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Environmentalists advocate the following: international 
organization empowerment, steady-state economic modeling, 
local environmental revolution, equitable distribution of 
wealth, scientific dependence, and, of course, one-world 
government, 32 i.e. , the "one earth perspective. 't1 3 At one 
end of the spectrum, Environmentalism re-conceptualizes 
the Marxist, Liberalist tenets of equity and emancipation, 
advocating a "revolution from below" through which 
proponents of the "Think Globally, Act Locally" 
perspective feed a movement which forces change into the 
system. 34 This movement is developed on the self-reliant 
community model that takes its doctrine from 
Transcendentalist ideas. At its most benign, this 
division is seen to appeal to a decentralized definition 
of management techniques; at its most radical, it is 
aligned with extreme post-industrial tribalism where non-
hierarchical communes reflect an eco-friendly way of 
life. 35 In the form of Ecocentrism, Environmentalism seeks 
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to "dismantle or bypass the modern nation state and 
establish decentralized, autonomous, human-scale 
communities." 36 
At the other extreme, Environmentalism presents the 
desire for global enforcement mechanisms, which should be 
developed through a universal network or organization. 37 
It is this latter appeal that is often seen as petition 
for one-world government. World government advocates 
recommend universal control of all international 
policymaking. The Environmentalist justification for this 
global-centric approach lies in an attempt to interrupt 
the "inertial tendency to remain unresponsive to changing 
security needs." 3 8 Environmentalist world government 
champions assert "it is essential to develop a principal 
world policy designed to serve the human interest as 
opposed to national interests;" 39 any national perspective 
becomes partisan from the global one. 40 Therefore, 
Environmentalists state that universal solutions, 
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environmental and otherwise, require universal 
governance. 41 The world security concept is inspired by 
Environmentalist recognition of a range of new 
environmental perils that transcend national borders and 
exceed the reactive capabilities of nation-states. And it 
is informed theoretically by a range of suppositions that 
emphasize new growth of global interdependence and the 
possibility of international cooperation. 42 
As such, the locus of Environmentalist theory 
concentrates on an attack against statehood. The precepts 
of such an attack lie in the Environmentalist assumption 
that the needs of the state and those of the global 
commons are antithetical. Principally, Environmentalism 
asserts that the goals of the national interest and 
national security ultimately degrade the commons, while 
the authority of sovereignty and the philosophy of global 
equity are opposed. 43 Further, the legitimacy of the state 
is questioned, based upon the perception of behavioral 
Bothwell, 20 
constraints inherent within the current system. 44 As such, 
Environmentalist perspectives prescribe that states must 
alter their behavior from one which exhibits true 
sovereignty to one which illustrates the natural 
interdependence of actors both environmentally and 
politically. 45 And, because Environmentalists see little 
within the current system which indicates that states will 
achieve this altered behavior, their focus on human 
interests causes them to advocate alternate political 
structures. 
Ultimately, Environmentalists advocate dramatic changes 
in the system, with the goal of achieving reduced state-
centrism. 46 Through universality, equity and intervention, 47 
Environmentalists attest, global policies must be 
implemented and enforced. In its most radical form, 
Environmentalism seeks to establish the environment above 
any political or social institution. 
Bothwell, 21 
THE REALIST CRITIQUE 
Despite the emergence of Environmentalism into 
mainstream politics, its theories have yet to be 
translated into comprehensive scholarly writings in 
political science. The need to define and develop an 
ecological political theory was recognized as early as 
1973. 48 Then, and now, fledgling ecological theories relied 
on notions of systemic alteration, a concept with serious 
drawbacks given the dominance of the nation-state system 
since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Further, 






the Environmentalist literature merely deliberates 
quantity of existing environmental problems requiring 
solutions; rarely is there a comprehensive discussion 
concerning what steps ought to be taken to effectively 
address the problematique. 49 In one respect this is a 
Bothwell, 22 
tribute to the effectiveness of Environmentalism in 
capturing the attention of analysts and policymakers; in 
another, it is a statement about the need for further 
discussion of the role of the state and Realism in 
relation to emergent theories of Environmentalism. Much 
of Environmentalist literature is devoted to either 
attacking Realist theories of world politics or asserting 
that the state no longer holds a legitimate existence. 50 
However, it is not 'an adequate deliberation merely to make 
these claims without incorporating a comprehensive look at 
the relationship, or lack of one, between Realism and 
Environmentalism. Further, the absence of this discussion 
in the face of this principal dichotomy weakens both 
international political and environmental theory; in 
addition, it may inhibit development of an adequate 
methodological 
policymaking. 
approach for effective environmental 
Although there is some disagreement about the parameters 
Bothwell, 23 
for environmental politics and international political 
theory, "the disputed ground," as Ann Hawkins calls it, 
provides a place for political inquiry. 51 Ultimately, 
political analysts need to develop comprehensive methods 
of determining environmental policy and environmental 
problem-solving strategies. These techniques will 
necessarily incorporate some of the arguments of 
Environmentalists; however, one must increase the realm of 
the discussion to ask: "How and how well, does the 
political system respond, or can be made to respond, to 
the accelerative spoilation, depletion and pollution of 
our physical habitat?" 52 There are several questions 
within this larger one. First, what are the deficiencies 
concerning environmental problem-solving at the systemic 
level? Second, what is the role of the state in 
environmental problem-solving? And, third, can an 
agreement be found to bridge the gap between 
Environmentalist claims of global catastrophe and Realist 
Bothwell, 24 
notions of international relations? 
Kenneth Waltz reminds us that the international system, 
by most accounts, is still a state-dominated structure. 
As such, theories of Realism remain the most pervasive 
perspective in international politics. 53 There are many 
sub-theories of Realism. In particular, Structural 
Realism54 and Neoreali@m have further developed the 
original premises of Classical Realism. 56 It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss the various types of 
Realism in-depth; however, the basic tenets of Realist 
thought, held in common and based upon a state-centric 
tradition, are evidenced throughout. Accordingly, 
references will not be made to the distinctions within the 
Realist paradigm, but will, in fact, refer to the major 
conflict between Realism and Environmentalism. 
Realists assert that interdependence, as presented by 
Environmentalists, is not much of a theory upon which to 
base altering the state-centric control of international 
Bothwell, 25 
relations. The problem with interdependence lies in its 
definition or the lack of a singular, comprehensive one; 
"interdependence is a concept before it is a fact, and 
unless the concept is defined, we cannot intelligibly 
discuss what the present condition of interdependence is, 
whether it has been increasing, and what its political 
implications may be. 57 Thus, despite the use of ubiquitous 
phrases such as "the shrinking planet, global village and 
international interdependence," 58 there is little evidence 
to suggest that the world must be taken as a whole. 
Rather, Realists submit that solutions to international 
problems continue to depend on national policies, and any 
approach to problem-solving must include the primary 
political actors, i.e. states. 59 
Still, Realists do not presume that states are 
indifferent to the actions of others. On the contrary, 
Realism suggests that states act and react to others, 
hence the need for self-help measures to contend with 
Bothwell, 26 
those situations in which the actions of one state have 
negative consequences for the other. However, the 
anticipation of exchanges between states that can affect 
policy decisions does not automatically imply situations 
of interdependence as defined by Environmentalists. As 
Arthur Stein illustrates, the idea that nations may 
exhibit a greater interconnectedness does not necessarily 
imply a mutual dependence. 60 In accordance with Waltz, 
Stein argues that interdependence may actually be the 
dependence of less powerful states upon the actions of 
greater powers. However, the opposite could scarcely 
prove true. Great powers may actually benefit from a 
theory of interdependence. It is the continued play of 
power-politics which fuels the Realist argument that 
interdependence is a perceptual construct which may only 
exist in limited situations. As such, "without 
necessarily denying such tendencies as economic 
interdependence or uneven development, Realists could 
Bothwell, 27 
argue that power-politics structures would refract and 
limit the effects of these tendencies in ways securing the 
structures themselves." 61 
The Realist thesis focuses on the international system's 
primary political actors and, therefore, necessarily 
incorporates power politics into a theory of international 
relations. The recent emphasis on purported political 
interdependence presupposes situations of equality and 
dependence that have yet to be proven existent. While 
arguing against this definition of interdependence, 
Realism does acknowledge that states are affected by the 
actions of others. For example, Keohane, a Neorealist, 
suggests three types of "interdependence" that are 
manifestations of state-to-state interaction and response. 
Keohane's first example is defined as instrumental 
interdependence. In this case, actors are said to be 
interested in the welfare of other actors insofar as 
"others can take action that affects them. "62 Secondly, 
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situational interdependence occurs when other actors' 
welfare can improve the first actor's situation. 63 
Examples include economic actions such as a recession 
which can adversely affect the economies of other states. 
Finally, empathetic interdependence is defined by Keohane 
as the acting in the benefit of others, simply for the 
sake of doing so. 64 
Although Waltz would agree that states often act in 
manners such as these, rather than acting strictly out of 
self-interest, he would hesitate to call these actions 
interdependence, especially as the term is utilized by 
Environmentalists. In the first case, instrumental 
interdependence appears to describe self-help behavior. 
States are interested in the actions of others, because 
they see those decisions as affecting themselves. Thus, 
they react with policies which minimize the adverse impact 
of others' policy decisions. Therefore, instrumental 
interdependence does not describe a situation where one 
Bothwell, 29 
state is dependent upon the actions of another to 
formulate its own policy decisions as is implied by 
Keohane; rather it describes the process of arriving at a 
rational cost-benefit analysis based upon the actions of 
others. 
Similarly in situational interdependence, actors seek to 
maximize the benefits of others' actions, and may even 
attempt policy coordination with those actors to achieve 
the most desirable outcome. Again, however, capitalizing 
on a situation where one actor's actions can benefit the 
first's does not indicate that either actor is dependent 
on the other for determining its own policy preferences. 
And, in empathetic interdependence, Keohane describes a 
situation in which states act out of empathy or moral 
insight. Although in the past, strictly Classical 
Realists have suggested a Hobbesian world where states act 
solely out of the desire for power, i.e. power-seeking 
behaviors, newer Realist constructs have not discounted 
Bothwell, 30 
state actions on the basis of morality. The latter is 
often thought to be a type of order-seeking behavior65 , 
where broadly-defined interest in preserving the 
international system as a whole, keeps states from 
eliminating any actor from the system. As such, states 
often act in ways which benefit others and ultimately 
benefit themselves. 66 None of Keohane's interdependence 
definitions are contradictory to Realist theories of state 
action, or conflict with stite-centric problem-solving. 
However, neither do they accurately reflect a situation 
which is interdependent and therefore do not advance 
Environmentalist arguments for cooperation based upon that 
notion. 
It would seem that where it is intended to illustrate a 
mutually dependent situation that encourages actors to 
cooperate either to alleviate a bad, or evenly distribute 
a good, interdependence is not a firmly established 
concept, and from the Realist point-of-view is not a 
Bothwell, 31 
motivator for gaining state participation in cooperative 
arrangements. The Realist-based concept of 
interdependence as sensi ti vi ty6 7 or vulnerabili ty 68 may play 
a role in bringing states to the table. Sensitivity, or 
the liability to costly effects imposed externally before 
policies are altered to attempt to modify the situation, 69 
and vulnerability, or the liability to costs imposed from 
outside even after policies are altered, 70 create the 
perception of the need to act in order to minimize 
negative outcomes. The levels of sensitivity or 
vulnerability, however, may be unequal as some states are 
better-equipped to deal with certain situations. If all 
member states perceive that there is some benefit 
associated with participating in a cooperative 
arrangement, or some cost associated with not doing so, 
sensitivity or vulnerability may motivate state 
participation. Again, however, the perception of 
sensitivity or vulnerability to a particular issue is not 
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political interdependence unless states also perceive 
reciprocity, or an even exchange of costs and benefits, to 
be associated with the arrangement. 71 
Thus, the Realist viewpoint does not suggest that states 
are impervious to environmental degradation of the global 
commons. However, it does refute Environmentalist claims 
which cling to a "domino theory" 72 of interdependence. 
Nation-states do not perceive that all occurrences of 
degradation will damage them directly, thus necessitating 
a response. 73 Rather, states perceive that they are 
susceptible to the actions of others, which may motivate 
those actors to participate in cooperative arrangements. 
The use of the term interdependence to describe political, 
economic or ecological situations where mutual dependence 
exists is neither agreed upon nor appears to act as a 
catalyst for state participation in environmental problem-
solving. Further, despite the attempts of some Realists 
from differing perspectives to qualify the idea of 
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interdependence perhaps initiating some common ground 
with Environmentalists, the notion of interdependence 
remains varied and of little use to policymakers. 
Therefore, as a construct which in the eyes of 
Environmentalists mandates altering the political control 
of the international system, the interdependence argument 
is inadequate. Only as the perception of a greater 
connectedness or interrelatedness does the idea of 
interdependence gain meaning and become useful in bringing 
about awareness of state susceptibility to environmental 
degradation. 
BRIDGING THE GAP 
Environmentalism remains a truncated ideology, despite 
several decades of intense effort on certain political 
issues. Albeit that Environmentalism is an evolving set 
of political ideas, Environmentalists "must develop a 
clear and consistent position on the full range of 
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political and social issues.,, 74 Several of the 
Environmentalist proposals can be adapted to fit the 
current Realist structure of the international system, but 
it is clear that recent Environmentalist commentary finds 
the state inadequate to address the problema tique of 
environmental problems. 75 Many Realists agree that "the 
time has come to give certain world interests primacy over 
various national, local and special interests." 76 However, 
this does not auger the demise of a Realist world polity, 
rather it illustrates the need for Environmentalists to 
develop an effective appeal to Realism. Instead of 
promoting structural change, Realists seek to develop 
problem-solving strategies within the constraints of the 
current system. Thus, this paper intends to suggest that 
global environmental interests might be better managed 
through increased nation-state participation, and 
consequently Environmentalists need to address those 
entities through a state-centric appeal. 
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It is the Realist perspective that Environmentalism 
commits the "is, ought" fallacy. 77 By attempting to address 
the international system that currently is in existence, 
with approaches of the way it ought to be, 
Environmentalism is not confronting the issue of problem-
sol ving. It is as though in accepting the structure of the 
Realists, Environmentalists believe that their arguments 
will be discounted. But will policy goals be undermined by 
focusing on the existent system? On the contrary, "moral 
values and policy goals can be well served, even best 
served, by putting them aside and proceeding detachedly 
long enough to enlarge empirical understanding of the 
obstacles that hinder realization of the values and 
progress toward the goals." 78 The dominant points of the 
Realist thesis are hardly outmoded by newer theories which 
advocate alternate systemic constructions, e.g. Idealism. 
Al though today there exists a system which includes 
other transnational actors, such as international 
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organizations, the Realist perspective does not deny this 
fact. Rather, it merely suggests that these actors are 
secondary to states. Further, it intimates that 
international associations and bodies are inventions of 
states, developed because they are useful to 
sovereignties. As such, the existence of other actors is 
dependent upon the legitimacy of states. In addition, 
there is much evidence to suggest that the state-centric 
international system is not being discarded in favor of 
another construct. Initially, there is the issue of 
sovereignty, which dictates that only states are 
guaranteed a certain legal status under international law; 
one that is denied to other global actors. 79 Secondly, 
states are the law-making entities under the system of 
international law. 80 Although there are different sources 
of law, states ultimately hold the right to ascribe to a 
set of laws, or to prevent those laws from being effective 
in the system. 81 As such, it seems highly improbable that 
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other types of international bodies could replace the 
authority of states. And, if states are the primary 
political actors, then it is inappropriate to formulate 
solutions to environmental problems without addressing 
those entities. 
The current Environmentalist argument focuses 
primarily on creating alternatives to nation-state 
dominance in the international system, instead of 
determining methods for gaining state participation. 
While this argument may represent some future structural 
method for addressing environmental dilemmas, it is 
unsuitable for the contemporary system; the obstacle to 
these techniques remains that sovereignties are not 
interested in relinquishing their position as primary 
actors. Furthermore, concentrating on alternatives may 
contribute to the continued lack of effective measures for 
addressing environmental issues. The problem-solvers of 
this world remain nation-states, and accordingly, problems 
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must be couched in terms to which states can respond. 
Without framing the question in a state-centric approach, 
operative solutions are unlikely to be developed, and 
without further development of theories of environmental 
policymaking, the Realist argument exudes powerful grounds 
for the failure of the Environmentalist approach. It is 
the crux of the Realist stance that problem-solving 
methods must be directed toward the political actors of 
the current international system. Any other approach will 
ultimately be constrained by the actions of those actors, 
and is, therefore, doomed to failure. Thus, Realism 
serves as a reminder; environmental problem-solving 
techniques which do not address states, may be consigning 
themselves to inadequacy. 
Solving the problematique of environmental concerns is 
a difficult task. In summary, the deficiencies concerning 
global environmental problem-solving include the 
following. In addition to the unreasonable approach of 
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Environmentalism, the process has been further hampered, 
it seems, by the incongruity between the state system best 
understood by the Realist perspective and the focus of 
Environmentalist appeals for action. Thus, the 
development of global environmental problem-solving 
strategies is often stymied, while current stop-gap 
measures are deficient in their approach. Furthermore, 
the pervasive nature of Realist theories causes 
Environmentalist appeals to seem fairly ineffective. The 
role of the state has been neglected by Environmentalism, 
and should be addressed. 
Despite the above, it is believed that the breach 
between Environmentalism and Realism can be mended; by 
recognizing that the Realist thesis does not reject the 
need to address environmental problems, Environmentalists 
can modify their approach to include states. Were this to 
occur, the possibility of developing environmental 
problem-solving strategies at the systemic level looks 
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hopeful; the catalyst for change lies in the evolution of 
a state-centric approach, rather than in an unrealistic 
attempt to eliminate nation-states. Environmentalists do 
not have to accept the present condition of the ecosystem, 
in other words, but they do have to accept the present 
political structure. 
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II. STATE PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM-SOLVING 
Realism and state-centric approaches to environmental 
problem-solving do provide optimism for Environmentalist 
concerns. Despite the criticism of Environmentalists, 
there are many examples of active state participation in 
environmental problem-solving. Furthermore, states are 
likely to continue to participate under certain 
circumstances; only three decades ago concern about the 
deteriorating state of the earth's environment was 
confined largely to the scientific community and groups of 
environmental activists. Since the 1960s, environmental 
concerns have risen rapidly to prominence as public 
issues, and are now leading policy problems on both 
national and international agendas. Environmental issues 
such as acid rain and ozone depletion have gained the 
attention of states; "both issues which were dismissed as 
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scare-mongering at the beginning of the decade [1980s] and 
by the end of the decade, were recognized as major threats 
justifying belated and expensive action." 82 Further, 
despite the evolutionary approach of states to 
environmental problem-solving, there have been some 
notable successes in the environmental field; for example, 
nuclear weapons are not being tested in the atmosphere, 
less hazardous waste is being dumped into the oceans, and 
significant progress has been made on issues such as acid 
rain and ozone depletion. 
As early as 1867, compacts between states indirectly 
included questions regarding the environment, through 
discussion of issues such as fishing rights. 83 In 1909, 
the US and Canada signed the historic Boundary Waters 
Agreement. This may represent the first recognition of 
the transboundary nature of the environment, and 
consequently, of environmentally-degrading agents. The 
principle of transboundary control was further established 
Bothwell, 43 
by the benchmark decision in the Trail Smelter Case of 
1941 in which "a specially convened tribunal ruled that 
Canada should compensate the United States for damages to 
orchards in the state of Washington that were caused by 
air pollutants drifting over the border from a smelter in 
Trail, British Columbia. " 84 These and many other examples 
are illustrative of state initiation of environmental 
problem-solving, seen in the generation of international 
agreements. Furthermore, the rate of adoption of 
environmental treaties has accelerated during recent 
decades: "only twenty were concluded between 1921 and 
1959, twenty-six during the 1960s, forty-nine during the 
1970s and forty-eight during the 1980s." 85 
In fact, following the end of the Cold War, many nations 
began to regard "ominous environmental trends as being one 
of the primary sources of insecurity for both current and 
future generations." 86 Evidence of state participation in 
environmental problem-solving directly conflicts with 
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Environmentalist claims that states are inadequate to 
address environmental problems because they lack the 
impetus to initiate problem-solving. The fact is, states 
are willing to participate in environmental problem-
solving under the right conditions. Many states, 
"including those most responsible for existing pollution, 
have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate" 87 on 
environmental issues. And, as illustrated by the increase 
in number of environmental agreements, states have been 
accelerating their efforts to create and strengthen 
international regulatory mechanisms that will slow the 
pace of environmental degradation and change. The fact 
states do participate in environmental problem-solving 
efforts, however, does not refute Environmentalist claims 
of inaction on certain issues. Thus, determining the 
factors that motivate state participation can provide a 
bridge between Environmentalist appeals and a Realist 
theory of international politics. Without such an 
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inquiry, Environmentalist petitions will continue to be 
"hit-and-miss." That is, sometimes such an appeal will 
coincide with a pre-conceived state interest, and will 
engender participation, but alternatively, an entreaty may 
also generate inactivity or worse, resistance. This 
possibility could upset the problem-solving process as it 
currently exists and further the rift between states and 
Environmentalists. 
In order to gain state participation in environmental 
problem-solving, three conditions appear to be necessary. 
First, states must be able to perceive the existence of an 
environmental problem which requires state involvement for 
resolution. Second, the state must be able to discern 
that the problem could have a state-centric consequence; 
in other words, states must perceive that the result of 
the problem will have a direct effect on the state itself. 
And thirdly, the state must have sufficient self-interest 
to respond to the problem, i.e. the state must find that 
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the benefits of response outweigh the costs. It is this 
latter condition that is the most difficult to determine 
and that is frequently thwarted by inhibiting factors 
which produce negative perceptions or uncertainty. For 
this reason, the cost-benefit issue needs to be addressed 
by Environmentalists more than any other topic. The 
following section presents elements intended to assist in 
the development of such an approach. The concepts of 
motivators and inhibitors, mentioned previously, are 
central to the discussion. 
INHIBITORS & MOTIVATORS: 
Creating Certainty or Uncertainty 
This section presents a conceptual model which relates 
inhibiting and motivating factors to a continuum of 
possible state responses to environmental problems. The 
goal is to contribute to an understanding of and possible 
development of a state-centric approach to resolving 
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environmental problems. The five principal courses of 
action which states can take to address environmental 
problem-solving are: resistance, inaction, capitulation, 
unilateral participation and multilateral participation or 
cooperation. The conditions under which each course of 
action becomes a logical policy option vary dependent upon 
the costs and benefits involved; therefore, an examination 
of each may be helpful in establishing a state-centric 
approach for environmental problem-solving. 
Initially, in a given situation there exist factors 
which can either encourage or discourage one of the five 
potential courses of state action; these have been labeled 
motivators and inhibitors. Further, perhaps these factors 
can be also promoted or suppressed in order to facilitate 
the outcome of participation between and among nations on 
a given environmental problem. Therefore, it is important 
to conduct an examination of the decision-making process, 
especially inhibitors preventing participation and 
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motivators encouraging participation, with the objective 
of clarifying as precisely as possible the conditions 
under which state response may occur. 
The introduction of uncertainty into the environmental 
problem-solving process often appears to stymie state 
participation. Uncertainty results when insufficient 
information causes actors to become unclear about their 
own policy goals. Primarily, uncertainty prevents clear 
understanding of expected outcomes in the decision-making 
process, thereby preventing a definite and prescribed 
course of action. Realists postulate that states exist 
in an anarchic world system and interact based upon self-
help strategies. One pattern exhibited by states through 
this continued interaction is the desire to maximize 
gains; 88 states are seen to perform a rational calculus 
whereby the benefits of participation must outweigh its 
costs. However, uncertainty is problematic for engendering 
state participation because it prevents a clear definition 
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of state preferences and manifests the perception of 
risk. 89 Thus, uncertainty in the problem-solving process 
can cause the rational calculus to become ineffectual. 
Axelrod has demonstrated that although the anticipated 
behavior of states is one where they act to maximize 
gains, states often cannot react in this manner when there 
is uncertainty in the cost-benefit analysis. 90 Instead, 
the uncertain situation often creates an indifference to 
the whole process as preferences become increasingly 
difficult to determine. 91 This behavior can be illustrated 
through probability theory using Theil's example: A State 
E faces a decision regarding alternatives (A, B; p, 1-p) 
where p is a number between O and 1, giving the outcome of 
A with the probability of p or B with the probability of 
l-p. 92 In such circumstances, the decision-maker is left 
with a choice which is uncertain: either the state will 
receive A or B, but cannot be sure of which. 93 As such, 
decision-making steps such as ranking, comparability and 
Bothwell, 50 
transivity become indeterminate, causing the development 
of concrete preferences to be difficult. 94 This predicament 
is further complicated by the addition of many actors, the 
typical situation in multilateral agreement negotiations, 
for if State E cannot determine its own preferences with 
any surety, it cannot be expected to communicate or 
negotiate upon this basis. 
The fact that environmental problems are so complex that 
they have been described as a problematique makes this 
type of problem-solving particularly difficult. It is 
characteristic of environmental problems that they are 
"multiplicitous and unfocused," 95 and consequently, 
uncertainty is a continual factor in the environmental 
problem-solving process. For this reason, the potential 
ramifications of environmental problems, and of their 
proposed solutions, often generate perceptions of risk on 
the part of states. Therefore, it is important to keep in 
mind the uncertainties and side effects in environmental 
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policymaking, which can stifle state participation and 
attempt to develop methods of overcoming them. 96 
This study hypothesizes that uncertainty in 
environmental problem-solving can manifest itself over 
three important areas: scientific bases, economic outcomes 
and political outcomes. As will be illustrated, 
overcoming uncertainty in each area may be critical to the 
establishment of ongoing state participation. Depending 
upon the type of environmental issue being deliberated, 
one type of uncertainty can assume preeminence over 
another. Further, uncertainty in one realm can contribute 
to indecision in another. Finally, it seems probable that 
issues with high levels of uncertainty in all three areas 
are unlikely prospects for gaining positive state 
participation and will result in non-participation. 
Bothwell, 52 
Scientific Uncertainty & the Need for Confirmation 
Lack of a scientifically confirmed environmental threat 
to states complicates attempts to gain their participation 
in environmental problem-solving. Although many 
agreements are initiated based upon their inherent 
utility, these are usually uncomplicated instruments with 
clear benefits and minimal costs associated with state 
participation. Examples of such cooperative interactions 
include agreements regarding human health standards, mail 
service, transportation regulations and trading 
practices. 97 However, because of the evolving perception 
about the importance of environmental problem-solving and 
the ramifications that environmental outcomes may have 
upon states, a clear perception of threat regarding 
specific environmental issues is key to the development of 
a perceived tangible state-centric consequence necessary 
for state participation. 
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States may have awareness regarding a specific 
environmental problem, but few will perceive the need for 
state involvement without se~ing the problem as directly 
affecting them, most often as a perceived threat to 
national interests. And, because states are self-
interested, concerned minimally about their survival and 
maximally about their position in relation to other 
states, 98 evidence of threat to national interests is a 
strong motivator. In fact, the greater the perception of 
threat, the less the need for certainty about specific 
outcomes and the lower the concern about relative gains. 
For example, in the ozone depletion issue, the perception 
of a health hazard was great enough that it overrode the 
need for knowledge about specific population numbers 
involved and the need to establish whether one state would 
incur more health hazard than other states. 99 
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Economic Uncertainty & the Need for Reciprocity 
Lack of reciprocity, or the absence of an even exchange, 
is another barrier to participation in multilateral 
situations where a large number of actors is involved . 100 
Reciprocity "refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent 
values in which the actions of each party are contingent 
on the prior actions of others in such a way that good is 
returned for good, and bad for bad." 101 While not confined 
to economics, reciprocity is especially important when 
economic uncertainty exists. High costs are often 
perceived as the outcome in many problem-solving efforts. 
Reciprocity in the form of a near-equal distribution of 
those costs can reduce economic uncertainty. In 
particular, cases where public goods, (i.e. goods which 
are available to all members) are at stake, "there are 
substantial incentives to behave as a 'free-rider' - not 
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pay for a good but gain from its provision by others. 11102 
Keohane has identified two separate occurrences of 
reciprocity which may be helpful in understanding state 
motivations. Specific reciprocity is used to refer to 
"situations in which partners exchange specified items of 
equiv a 1 en t v a 1 u e in a strict 1 y de 1 i mi t ed sequence , " 103 
while diffuse reciprocity is less precise about the items 
or their exact equivalence. 104 Although specific 
reciprocity is often thought to be influential in 
promoting cooperation, diffuse reciprocity may be just as 
important under certain conditions. For example, under 
specific reciprocity, states would be required to 
contribute equally to an environmental problem-solving 
strategy. However, states are inherently unequal, and as 
such may not be able to make equal contributions to an 
environmental problem-solving effort. Naturally, some 
states have a greater economic base, better technology and 
more resources, and are, therefore, better-equipped to 
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implement proposed environmental controls. For this 
reason, concern over specific reciprocity is not only 
unwarranted, but often unfeasible for some cooperative 
arrangements. 
On the other hand, diffuse reciprocity in environmental 
problem-solving can be pursued logically and to the 
satisfaction of most states. Often diffuse reciprocity 
could take the form of norms of behavior surrounding an 
issue; that is, actors will contribute their share not 
because of expected rewards, but because of the desire for 
continuing satisfactory overall results for the group in 
which they participate. 105 For example, states could agree 
to limit their use of a public good such as water in order 
to fulfill the requirements of a specific environmental 
agreement. While states would be able to implement this 
goal differently and unequally, the commitment to do so 
would be reciprocal and go a long way towards establishing 
trust and the perception of absolute gains, or individual 
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pay-offs. Overcoming cost objections and reducing 
economic uncertainty are important steps in developing 
state interest in environmental problem-solving. 
Reciprocity is one established mechanism which can 
distribute costs and alleviate state fears about a 
problem-solving effort. 
Political Uncertainty & the Need for Clear Rewards: 
The presence of clear political rewards can also be 
important to eliminating uncertainty and engendering state 
participation in any cooperative effort. In environmental 
problem-solving, rewards in the political arena are doubly 
important because they are often obscure. Instead of 
perceiving political gains, states frequently associate 
high costs with participation and are reticent to commit 
time or resources to potentially negative outcomes. In 
addition, political rewards are usually described by 
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Realists in terms of power106 , or the ability to establish 
and maintain control of one state over another. 107 Waltz 
suggests that factors such as weapons acquisition, 
expanded territory and desire for maximizing wealth are 
rewards that nations seek to increase their political 
power. 108 Thus, political power is not always a positive 
reward in an environmental problem-solving effort, as it 
does not represent an equivalent gain for all players. 
Furthermore, if all actors involved hold the same 
perception about payoffs, one state's gain becomes 
another's loss and causes a zero-sum game . 109 
Because of this view that power is the most desirable 
political reward, the perception of concrete political 
gains may be the most difficult motivator to develop in 
environmental problem-solving. However, there are 
additional political rewards which can be utilized in an 
environmental problem-solving effort. Membership is an 
important aspect of international relations. As evidenced 
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in groups such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and the European Union, the desirability of belonging to 
communities of states can be an important reward. 
Conversely, exclusion from such arrangements can also be 
a motivator. Perhaps the member states of a particular 
environmental problem-solving effort could also be the 
recipients of any long-term benefits of participation, 
while non-participants would be excluded from those 
benefits. For example, promises to grant technology 
transfers could produce a political impetus for 
participation, in addition to providing a future economic 
benefit. As expanded upon in the section on multilateral 
participation, Axelrod has shown that concern over future 
relationships with other actors is important to states. 110 
Therefore, a significant source of political rewards can 
be found in the perception a reticent state has that the 
problem-solving effort will affect its relations with 
other states in the future; special agreements, group 
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membership and improved relations are all potential gains 
which can be motivators for state participation. 
Because they frequently appear to be intangible or 
nebulous, political inhibitors may be equally exacting to 
identify and resolve. However, reducing or eliminating 
political uncertainty can come from gaining initial state 
interest in the problem-solving effort. As will be 
explored in the discussion of unilateral participation, 
establishing a single state's desire to participate may 
bring about greater levels of state participation. 
Further, the development of widespread problem perception 
may also alleviate the estimation of significant 
political risk by eliminating the fear that other states 
will not be amenable to participation. Finally, the use 
of past successes in environmental problem-solving may 
also strengthen political certainty on issues where other 
objections do not exist. The fact that perceptions about 
the importance of the environment as a whole have evolved 
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to reflect state interest bodes well for decreased 
political risk in some environmental problem-solving 
efforts. 
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III. INHIBITORS & MOTIVATORS: 
A Model of State Response 
Scarcity of clear rewards, lack of reciprocity, and 
absence of threat are important inhibitors to state 
participation in environmental problem-solving. 
Conversely, establishing benefits, reciprocal arrangements 
and a perception of threat are positive motivators which 
can reduce uncertainty and gain state involvement. On 
many environmental issues the problem perception has been 
initially established; and as previously stated, many 
states are now aware of the hazards of pollution and the 
potential ramifications of wanton destruction of natural 
resources. However, state-centric consequences have not 
yet been determined on specific issue areas; without such, 
it remains unlikely that states will find sufficient self-
interest to participate. Reductions in scientific, 
economic and political uncertainties through 
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identification of inhibitors and motivators can reverse 
this cycle. Inhibitors produce state non-participation on 
certain issues, and positively, they imply the methods by 
which participation can be encouraged. Although non-
participation may have once been the preferred policy 
option, the emergence of awareness over environmental 
concerns, perhaps due in part to the arguments of 
Environmentalists, has increased overall state 
participation in environmental problem-solving. What is 
now needed is the development of factors which will 
motivate state participation and overcome those objections 
states have to participating in arrangements which appear 
to hold little benefit or significant cost. 
The model which follows is intended as a beginning step 
toward this goal. The five courses of state participation 
and how they are influenced by inhibitors and motivators 
controlling uncertainty are presented. These actions are 
arranged on a continuum from least responsive (resistance) 
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to most responsive (multilateral participation or 
cooperation) . Between the two extremes are a more 
moderate negative response (inaction), a neutral stance 
(capitulation) and a moderate positive stance (unilateral 
action) . This arrangement is not arbitrary; rather, it is 
logically implied by correlating the inhibiting and 
motivating factors along the same continuum from negative 
through uncertainty to positive as follows: 
Figure 1. The Logical Relationship Between Political Courses 
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As the reader can determine from analysis of the figure, 
where all of the factors are negative there is a high 
degree of inhibition to positive action which is expressed 
as resistance by the actor. Where the factors are 
somewhat less negative, there is less inhibition and the 
response becomes passive inaction, rather than the more 
active response of resistance. In the case of a rough 
balance between positive and negative factors and 
uncertainty exists, there is a more or less neutral stance 
and the actor is open to capitulation in the face of 
strong arguments from fellow actors. Where the weight of 
the factors becomes more positive than negative, the actor 
may decide upon unilateral action in its own self-
interest. Finally, where all factors are highly positive, 
the state is impelled to act in concert with other actors 
toward an international solution to the problem and 
multilateral participation or cooperation occurs. In the 
remainder of this section, each of these courses of action 
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will be examined in the light of the model presented here. 
RESISTANCE: 
The first type of state participation is the most 
negative option and is the result of key inhibitors such 
as ill-defined benefits or perceived high costs. 
Resistance implies that problem recognition has occurred, 
but the cost-benefit analysis is such that states are 
withstanding pressure from interested states or other 
political actors to engage in the problem-solving effort. 
Resistance does not intimate disinterest, but rather a 
strong predilection to avoid participation. Because 
resistance is the strongest negative response to 
environmental problem-solving, it is also a reflection of 
issues which contain ·the most inhibitors to state 
participation. Thus issues which engender resistance will 
require the greatest use of motivators to overcome 
objections. Unlike inaction, however, resistance is a 
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clear decision not to participate based upon the 
perception of certain negative outcomes. Only in 
resistance is state decision-making taken to the extreme 
left of the model; resistance does not evidence 
uncertainty over future costs, instead a resistant state 
perceives negative outcomes that it objects to. Only the 
introduction of more positive information can then alter 
the condition of resistance into a more uncertain cost-
benefit analysis, ultimately paving the way for the 
introduction of motivators to encourage a more positive 
response. 
Resistance often occurs despite some states perceiving 
a state-centric consequence, and therefore exhibiting the 
desire to participate. Resistance can be politically 
inspired and seek not only to maintain a no regrets policy 
for the state itself, but hope that other states will 
negatively follow suit and boycott participation. Because 
of bandwagoning, states exhibiting resistance may attempt 
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to prevent the momentum of other state participation, in 
order to limit their own involvement. Thus, resistance 
can be politically motivated non-participation, which may 
have the effect of preventing a multilateral coordinated 
policymaking decision. For example, the resistance of the 
United States to initial negotiations on the ozone 
depletion issue jeopardized the entire effort until, in 
light of overwhelming scientific evidence, Dupont Chemical 
Corporation made the decision to comply with the proposed 
CFC ban and initiated the development of acceptable, 
environmentally-safe substitutes. 111 
Clearly resistance by powerful states can have a greater 
impact upon cooperative arrangements. However, many 
environmental problems implicate smaller, less-developed 
states as key players in potential problem-solving 
efforts. Because poverty has often necessitated policies 
damaging to the environment, smaller states are 
contributing increasingly to environmental problems. 
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Costa Rica, for example, is one of the largest 
contributors to deforestation because of its continued 
conversion of forests to cattle ranching . 112 Thus, the 
resistance of small states to cooperative agreements can 
also stall multilateral environmental problem-solving. 
INACTION: 
Environmentalists often accuse states of inaction, and 
therefore, justify their claims of state inadequacy in 
environmental problem-solving. However, there can be good 
reasons for continued inaction, not the least of which is 
the complexity of the issues-at-hand, and the unknown 
outcomes of many policy options. In particular, when the 
costs appear high and the benefits either negligible or 
unknown, inaction is the logical policy option in a cost-
benefit analysis. Inaction is one step removed from 
resistance; that is, the factors inhibiting participation 
are high, but not as high as in the situation which causes 
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outright resistance to participation. In choosing 
inaction, states may not participate for a variety of 
reasons relative to uncertainty. For example, scientific 
uncertainty may prevent problem recognition, the first 
necessary condition for participation. Or, combined areas 
of uncertainty may allow for a limited understanding of 
the environmental problem to be resolved, but prevent 
perception of a relevant state-centric consequence from 
emerging. 
However, unlike resistance, inaction implies an apathy 
toward the environmental problem-solving process; possibly 
the environmental problem is debated in Environmentalist 
literature, but concerted attempts to address the issue 
have either yet to result or have been ignored by states. 
Further, as a reflection of power politics, resistance 
holds more implications for continued prevention of an 
overall solution to a specific environmental issue than 
inaction, as the latter can often be overcome through 
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small reductions in uncertainty. For example, inaction 
is the logical policy option for states when faced with a 
new and uncertain prospect. This was exactly the case 
when concerns about hazardous waste management arose in 
the 1960s. However, once scientific certainty over the 
damage created by unchecked dumping became clear, states 
initiated a variety of agreements to regulate this problem 
both domestically and internationally. In all 
probability, following the availability of greater amount 
of information and thus, certainty, states became 
concerned over long-term potential costs to national 
interest over this issue. Thus, while inaction is clearly 
not a positive state response, it represents a situation 
of uncertainty. This situation provides opportunities for 
Environmentalists to increase the amount of reliable 
information to states, thereby potentially tilting the 
cost-benefit analysis in favor of limited participation. 
Therefore, while inaction has been the basis for 
Bothwell, 72 
Environmentalist criticism, it also provides the starting 
point for harmonizing Environmentalist appeals and the 
policy needs of states. 
CAPITULATION: 
As illustrated by Canada's unilateral attempts to alter 
policies regarding dumping of wastes in international 
waters adjacent to its coastlines (an action explored in 
the next section), repeated attempts by individuals or 
small groups of states to address certain environmental 
issues often can gain wider state participation. Thus, 
capitulation represents a rough balance between a negative 
and positive response on the continuum. Overcoming 
initial objections to environmental problem-solving and 
establishing minimal participation can result in 
capitulation; through the process of bandwagoning, states 
will often follow suit once an initiator leads the way 
toward establishing new policies. Again, key to this 
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whole mechanism is the need for a state-centric 
consequence to be presented for the instigator and for 
subsequent participators. However, while the state-
centric consequence may be difficult to establish for the 
initial participant, the very fact that at least one state 
identifies such a consequence will engender some awareness 
on the part of other states. Clearly, bandwagoning can 
only result if either the initiator receives obvious gains 
from its participation, or if that state is in a position 
to influence the perceptions of other states. Thus, 
bandwagoning may be a reflection of power politics in some 
cases. The fact that Bangladesh is very concerned about 
the predicted rise in sea-level from global warming has 
done little to motivate others to push for a cooperative 
arrangement. 113 Again, this points to political Realism 
and the need to keep an understanding of international 
politics in mind when arguing for environmental problem-
solving. Power politics is very much an aspect of all 
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international negotiations, and therefore should be 
remembered; gaining the interest of powerful states in 
environmental problem-solving is an important method of 
ensuring its success. 
In ·addition to bandwagoning, the use of "side payments" 
to encourage participation is one method of gaining wider 
state involvement. Side payments are a means of 
overcoming objections to specific costs associated with a 
particular environmental problem-solving arrangement. 
Because equity issues appeared to predominate "behind the 
initial reluctance and in some cases, continuing 
resistance, of less-developed countries to participate in 
the CFC regulatory process," 114 the use of side payments 
became increasingly important to the negotiations on the 
ozone depletion issue. Other concessions for economically 
disadvantaged states, who perceived themselves to be 
greatly impacted by elimination of CFC' s, had to be 
established prior to their consent; one of the concessions 
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was the establishment of a grace period for CFC 
elimination until 2010. 115 Eliminating this primary 
inhibitor was important to the larger states involved and 
contributed to the overall effectiveness of the entire 
problem-solving effort. Thus, overcoming objections, or 
facilitating the emergence of motivators, may become a 
crucial aspect of generating capitulation and 
establishing wider state participation. 
UNILATERAL PARTICIPATION: 
The fourth course of action which states can opt for is 
that of unilateral participation. There are many positive 
examples of unilateral action benefitting environment on 
the part of states. Environmentalists have discounted 
unilateral measures because they have minimal impact on 
the global ramifications of environmental problems. For 
example, it has been determined that unilateral 
elimination of C02 would only have a minimal impact on 
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overall global C02 reductions: 
Any benefit of a unilateral reduction in C02 
emissions by one country is therefore scaled down by 
a factor equal to the proportion of global C02 
emissions coming from that country, and the biggest 
such proportion is only 23% for the largest single 
emitter (the U.S.A.) . 116 
However, individual state participation should not be 
immediately deprecated. While initially negligible 
environmentally, unilateral actions may have significant 
political impact. Unilateral participation is one way to 
gain capitulation from other states, thereby widening 
participation on a given environmental issue. Because of 
this potential, and because the advent of one state's 
participation indicates the presence of significant 
motivators, unilateral participation is viewed as a 
positive response to Environmentalist appeals. Further, 
the presence of initial state awareness over a particular 
issue, as is the case in unilateral participation, 
presents the likelihood that states will make known their 
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objections to multilateral participation. Thus, it is 
believed that unilateral participation provides a window 
of opportunity for Environmentalists to gain information 
about state objections and overcome state uncertainties. 
If so, then many issues will become potential prospects 
for a cooperative decision-making effort. Consider, for 
example, the attempts of Canada at preventing water 
pollution off its coasts and the resulting widespread 
state involvement. 
The Examination of Positive State Response: 
A Case Study of Canada's Unilateral Problem-Solving 
Following a pivotal incident which raised the awareness 
of the environmental consequences of oil pollution, the 
foundering of the Torrey Canyon off the English coastline 
in 1967, Canada as well as many other coastal states 
raised the issue of preventive measures for polluting 
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activities. 117 The discharge of oil from the Torrey 
Canyon caused large-scale pollution to Great Britain's 
territorial waters and ultimately helped bring about the 
Convention on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution118 and the Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage in 1969. 119 These Conventions 
reflected the recognition by states that global measures 
were required to contend with the problem of humanly 
introduced pollutants such as oil. The parties to the 
Convention on Intervention agreed to: 
take such measures on the high seas as may be 
necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and 
imminent danger to their coastline or related 
interests from pollution or threat of pollution of 
the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or 
acts related to such a casualty, which may be 
expected to result in major harmful consequences. 120 
However, despite the recent development of international 
law to include liability for oil pollution, Canada was 
dissatisfied with the measures' lack of foresight. 
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Although the signatories of the Convention on Intervention 
agreed to preventive measures for protection of coastline 
and the territorial sea, these were to be taken only after 
the casualty had occurred on the high sea. Further, the 
injured state was required to consult with the other 
states affected by such actions, particularly the flag 
state or states alleged to have generated the oil . 121 
Canada was also displeased with the outcome of the Civil 
Damage Convention; "in its view, strict liability was not 
adequate because of the fact that the carriage of oil by 
sea is inherently an ultrahazardous occupation, and as 
such should give rise to absolute liability, with no 
exemptions whether in respect of natural causes or 
otherwise." 122 In addition, Canada was concerned about 
the spatial limitations of the Civil Damage Convention. 
The fact that discharges in the high seas would have 
pollutive effects on the contiguous zones prior to 
affecting the territorial sea was a key consideration for 
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Canada's fishing industry. Further, the fact that the 
limits of territorial seas differed among states gave rise 
to spatial inequities by "giving greater rights to those 
which had extended their territorial seas to the widely 
accepted twelve-mile limit, while those who maintained the 
traditional three-mile belt would not even be able to 
recover in respect of injury caused to fishing interests 
in the contiguous zone. 123 
Perceived inequities between flag states and coastal 
countries also plagued the Conventions. Canada with its 
lengthy coastline and close proximity to American tanker 
trade routes was instrumental in securing the terms of the 
Convention on Intervention to cover "major" damage as 
opposed to damage with "catastrophic" or "disastrous" 
consequences . 124 In addition, Canada successfully opposed 
attempts of flag states to require the actions of coastal 
states to reflect the principles of the Convention in 
their own territorial seas. And, although unsuccessful, 
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Canada attempted to broaden the parameters of the 
Convention on Intervention to include all pollutants 
instead of restricting them solely to oil. 125 Because of 
Canada's belief that the Conventions were inadequate to 
address its needs, th~ state abstained on the Convention 
on Intervention and voted against the Civil Damage 
Convention; specifically, Canada determined that the two 
Conventions "did not pay sufficient attention to the 
fundamental interests of coastal states as compared with 
commercial interests of flag states who favored a minimum 
of interference. "126 Instead, to augment the terms of the 
Conventions, Canada then amended its declaration under the 
"optional clause" of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice in 1970 to exclude: 
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction of 
rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of 
the conservation, management or exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the 
prevention or control of pollution or contamination 
of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to 
the coast of Canada. 127 
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Although Canada's actions were considered a radical 
departure from the norm at the time of the Conventions, 
they were in complete accordance with the instruments of 
international law. Initially, Canada's actions were in 
line with the judgement handed down by the Tribunal in the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration128 in which Canada was the 
respondent state. The decision of the Tribunal indicated 
not only that Canada was liable for the damaging effects 
of the smelter on the territory of the plaintiff, the 
United States, but also that Canada must refrain from such 
actions which might cause further damage, thereby 
instituting preventive measures for future operations. In 
principle, this type of temporal regulation was what 
Canada sought in its attempts to broaden the 1969 
Conventions. Once the damage from oil or other pollutants 
had been caused, there should be nothing preventing the 
injured state from adopting measures for future control of 
such occurrences through application of an injunction. 129 
Bothwell, 83 
Canada introduced additional anti-pollution legislation 
in 1970. Both the Act to Prevent Pollution of Areas of 
the Arctic Waters Adjacent to the Mainland and Islands of 
Canadian Arct ic130 and the amended Canada Shipping Act were 
legislative attempts to unilaterally control pollutive 
acts adjacent to the Canadian territorial sea and 
contiguous zones. And, both Acts were significantly more 
stringent than the 1969 international Conventions in their 
definitions of polluting activities and the liabilities 
imposed for such act ions. Specifically, pollution is 
defined as "the deposit of waste of any type within the 
Canadian Arctic," while waste is defined as any substance 
, which if added to the waters would alter the quality of 
the water "to an extent that is detrimental to their use 
by man or by any animal, fish or plant that is useful to 
man." 131 The Canadian Shipping Act extended the principles 
of the Canadian Arctic Act to all Canadian waters and 
fishing zones. 132 
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Much of the unilateral activity of Canada has been 
protested by affected states. However, where it did not 
produce this result, the motion has been followed by 
similar activities by other states, and "in the case of 
the continental shelf, eventually brought about a change 
in the law, culminating in a convention giving effect to 
such change. 133 Thus, while Canada's policy decision may 
have had limited effect upon international water 
pollution, it captured the attention of states worldwide. 
Once considered extreme, through the process of 
bandwagoning, many states have followed suit and the 
concept of liability for polluting activities, i.e. the 
"polluter pays" principle, is now commonplace. The 
establishment of awareness is one potential outcome of 
such unilateral participation, and the development of 
behavioral norms, which can greatly impact environmental 
problem-solving, is another. 
As illustrated, unilateral policymaking can have the 
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effect of elevating environmental problems from issues of 
low priority to those of international importance. 
Individual state participation is clearly undertaken out 
of a singular perception of self-interest. An issue which 
inspires unilateral action at the risk of of fending 
neighboring states must be of high importance to the 
initiating state. Through bandwagoning, however, it is 
possible that a particular issue could gain similar 
significance to other states. Finally, unilateral action 
has the benefit of creating first-mover advantage for the 
participant. In complex issues, where technology becomes 
a key factor for implementation, the first mover advantage 
allows the initiator to gain a greater benefit should 
others follow. 134 For example, in the ozone depletion 
issue, the planned development of CFC substitutes by 
Dupont Chemical Corporation gave the United States an 
economic gain over other countries following the CFC 
ban. 135 Ultimately, while limited in their environmental 
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impact, unilateral actions can have significant political 
clout and are worthy of both further analysis and 
encouragement. In terms of the conceptual model, the 
Canadian Case Study can be viewed as a proactive stance by 
a single state to maximize its position once motivators 
encouraging state response were realized. That is, once 
there was a confirmed basis of threat in the actions of 
other nations, Canada took steps to assure manageable 
economic outcomes and beneficial political outcomes for 
itself. In so doing, it was helping point the way toward 
the possibility of similar efforts being simultaneously 
employed by two or more states in a multilateral approach 
to environmental problem-solving. 
MULTILATERAL PARTICIPATION OR COOPERATION: 
Realism is often criticized by Environmentalists and 
other Idealist-based theorists for its apparent focus on 
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conflict. However, newer Realist constructs have shown 
optimism for cooperative arrangements and have re-examined 
that notion. In particular, Arthur Stein illustrates the 
shortcomings of theories which focus solely on occurrence 
of either cooperation or conflict. As Stein contends, 
"nations are neither inveterate cooperators nor 
defectors." 136 Rather, outcomes of either cooperation or 
conflict are the result of the strategic choices of states 
engaged in a rational cost-benefit analysis. Thus, both 
options are aspects of states' strategic menu-for-choice, 
and are used to ensure survival and fulfill national 
interests. 137 Most importantly, Stein reinforces the idea 
that states have the capacity for cooperation; if they 
eschew that strategy in favor of competition or conflict, 
it is a reflection of the presence of factors which 
promote those choices in a rational cost-benefit 
analysis. 138 
Although cooperation is but one state response to 
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environmental problem-solving, it is often thought to be 
the most effective. Because of their inherent complexity, 
transboundary nature and changing outcomes, environmental 
problems appear to require a concerted effort in order to 
alter their effects. As Rowlands points out: 
The emergent challenges constitute a distinct 
category of international problems, unlike any in the 
past. Thus they lie beyond the scope of established 
diplomacy and international relations. While 
impinging on the strategic interests of individual 
nations, they are generally unsusceptible to the 
standard response to major threats, namely military 
force. Rather, they require a basically different 
response, with emphasis on coordination instead of 
confrontation. 139 
However, as cooperation is a type of coordinated behavior, 
it is not equivalent to harmony, where states would have 
identical interests and act concertedly to achieve those 
interests. 140 Rather, cooperation can exist within the 
presence of divergent interests under certain conditions. 
It is these conditions that can bridge the gap between 
theories of Realism and Environmentalist approaches to 
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problem-solving. Cooperating states attempt to coordinate 
their actions in order to obtain desirable outcomes; in 
other words, "it is anticipated that all players will 
accrue benefits," and that cooperation is not a zero-sum 
game. 141 Keohane defines cooperation as the following: 
cooperation requires that the actions of separate 
individuals or organizations - which are not in pre-
existent harmony - be brought into conformity with 
one another through a process of negotiation, which 
is often referred to as 'policy' coordination. 
Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior 
to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, 
through a process of policy coordination. 142 
Historically states have entered into mechanisms for 
international cooperation such as conventions, treaties 
etc., to establish order in the anarchical international 
system and to escape suboptimal results from acting 
unilaterally. However, achieving cooperation can be 
difficult. Because of the tendency to form a Prisoner's 
Dilemma, 143 in which the preferred strategy is to defect, 
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Realism has often looked to competitive strategies as 
dominant behavioral tendencies. 144 The Prisoner's Dilemma 
is so named for a scenario in which two accomplices are 
arrested and questioned separately leading to the choice 
either of defection, confessing and implicating the other 
in exchange for a lighter sentence, or cooperating, 
refusing to name the other in hope that the accomplice 
will do the same. Under these conditions the chances of 
cooperation are very slim, despite the presence of a 
mutual reward in the form of a minor sentence. Because 
Prisoner's Dilemma, in its original form, is not an 
iterated game, that is, it is not likely that the two 
prisoners will interact under the same conditions again, 
defection becomes the preferred option; both players have 
an incentive to defect no matter whether the other 
cooperates or defects. The preference ordering for both 
players is DC > CC > DD > CD, where D represents defection 
and C represents cooperation. 145 Therefore, the dominant 
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strategy becomes to defect before the other prisoner can 
do so. 
Luckily, in the real world, individual states engaged in 
Prisoner's Dilemma situations are not likely to confront 
each other only once. 146 Instead, they are more apt to 
engage in equivalent repeated plays of the same scenario. 
According to Axelrod, continued interaction results in a 
concern for the future. It is this concern for future 
actions which can help to promote cooperation; a game with 
a future offers players higher payoffs in the long run for 
mutual cooperation than for mutual defection and provides 
a means for punishing a previous defection. 147 Axelrod' s 
work is instrumental in showing that continued interaction 
is what makes cooperation based on reciprocity, or an even 
exchange, to be possible. 148 Furthermore, the more future 
payoffs are valued in relation to current payoffs, the 
less incentive there exists to defect today . 149 Thus, 
establishing a concern for the future, what Axelrod calls 
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"lengthening the shadow of the future," is important to 
generating a lasting cooperative arrangement where the 
impetus to defect remains low. 150 In particular, the 
development of long-time horizons, regularization of the 
stakes involved in the arrangement, facilitation of 
reliable information about others' actions and 
availability of quick information regarding changes in 
others' actions are factors which can promote the 
incidence of cooperation and lengthen the shadow of the 
future. 151 
Although the shadow of the future represents a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for cooperation 
to emerge, concern for the future must be important enough 
to overwhelm attempts to defect on the present play. 152 
This strategy has been proven effective in computer 
simulations of predictive choice. Labeled TIT FOR TAT 
(TFT) by Axelrod, under repeated play, a TFT strategy 
cooperates on the first move and repeats the subsequent 
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moves of the other players. Thus, TFT "is never the first 
to defect; it forgives an isolated defection after a 
single response, but is always incited by a defection no 
matter how good the interaction has been so far." 153 
Axelrod' s findings are important in the context of 
environmental problem-solving. TFT is successful despite 
the presence of anarchy and state actors represented as 
egoists. By depicting states as egoists, i.e. those who 
are seeking to maximize their own payoffs, Axelrod 
illustrates how cooperation can occur within political 
Realism. 154 Furthermore, Axelrod uncovers two important 
realities in state-centric environmental problem-solving: 
first, cooperation on environmental problem-solving can 
occur in the absence of any central authority as an 
enforcement mechanism; second, states will often be self-
interested, concerned with their own payoffs (absolute 
gains), and preoccupied with their payoffs in relation to 
other actors (relative gains) . The presence of these 
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barriers to action illustrates why Environmentalist 
appeals do not motivate states to act upon current 
environmental problem-solving approaches: because they 
either presume the necessity of a central authority or of 
altruistic actors. Axelrod also exemplifies that 
cooperation and a state-centric approach are compatible. 
In particular, the fact that environmental problem-solving 
is a non-zero-sum game, where one state's gain does not 
generate another state's loss, is critical and ensures the 
importance of TFT as a strategy for enhancing cooperative 
arrangements. This factor is significant because in zero-
sum situations, players have no incentive to cooperate 
even under iterated play, as mutual rewards do not 
exist. 155 
Gaining cooperation on environmental issues is not 
necessarily easy. Concerns over free ridership and 
di vision of costs are key inhibitors to gaining state 
participation in cooperative arrangements. Janice Stein 
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examines the notion that states may of ten choose 
cooperation not to make gains, but to avoid losses. Loss 
avoidance occurs when the identified options promise no 
benefits, only costs, and the strategy chosen is the one 
that minimizes those anticipated costs. 156 This strategy 
is rational under a cost-benefit analysis and is 
consistent with both Realist theories of international 
relations and Axelrod's premises about dominant behavior 
under conditions of multiple play. Minimizing loss has 
two ramifications in environmental problem-solving. 
First, states will seek to better their positions 
relatively, by seeking a more equitable distribution of 
costs based upon ability to pay. This strategy is seen to 
have affected the negotiations over the ozone depletion 
problem and stalled global warming talks, where the 
division between the more highly industrialized countries 
of the North and the economically disadvantaged states of 
South was due to the perception of different costs 
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associated with cooperation. Second, concern over free 
riders will affect policymaking decisions of member 
states. Identifying and sanctioning potential defectors 
is problematic for a problem-solving arrangement. Each 
state may seek to be a free-rider and rely upon the other 
participants to enforce the rules. 157 
However, environmental problems inherently require the 
application of technology and expertise, thus, the 
presence of incentives for cooperation are readily 
available. For example, larger, more technologically 
advanced states can compete for the first-mover advantage 
discussed previously. In addition, trade arrangements for 
the exporting of technological assistance to smaller 
states could provide long-lasting economic benefits for 
larger participants. And, despite being tempted by the 
possibility of free ridership, smaller states have the 
incentive of gaining technological expertise and economic 
side benefits through their participation. Most 
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importantly, fear of being excluded from crucial 
relationships with powerful states provides a strong 
disincentive for defecting . 158 
Mutual rewards do exist in environmental problem-solving 
situations, despite the fact that they may sometimes be 
unequal; the greater the ability to eliminate uncertainty 
and establish clear benefits, the greater the impetus to 
cooperate. Thus, cooperation on environmental problem-
solving is either inhibited or promoted by the factors 
discussed previously: introduction of clear rewards, 
development of reciprocity, and the perception of threat. 
Where these factors are lacking or absent, there is 
little impetus for cooperation, as the next section 
indicates. 
Examination of Uncertainty and Inactive State Response: 
A Case Study of Attempts at a Global Warming Initiative 
Environmentalists have argued that climate change, in 
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general, and global warming, in particular, are among the 
most important environmental problems to be addressed. 
However, they are also illustrative of issues containing 
high levels of uncertainty. 
itself in a variety of forms. 
Uncertainty can manifest 
Specifically, scientific, 
economic and political uncertainty appear to present 
obstacles to state participation in environmental problem-
sol ving. Scientific uncertainty appears to prevent clear 
problem recognition which may lead to inaction. Economic 
uncertainty may lead to policy preferences in favor of 
competing issues, and political uncertainty often can lead 
to conditions of mistrust and political resistance. In 
this case study, each of these forms will be explored as 
a potential barrier to environmental problem-solving 
through cooperation or policy coordination. 
Normally, the earth's atmosphere allows sunlight to 
filter through, reflecting the resulting solar energy as 
infrared radiation. Some of this radiation remains 
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trapped in the earth's atmosphere by natural agents such 
as clouds. However, the introduction of human-induced 
gases can cause more of this radiation to be stored, and 
may cause a rise in the atmospheric temperature. The 
chief "greenhouse gas" emitted by human activities is 
carbon dioxide (C02 ), principally from the burning of 
fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) but also from 
the elimination of C02 "sinks" through deforestation and 
other destruction of the earth's natural vegetation 
cover. 159 This increase in greenhouse gases has, in ef feet, 
thickened the atmospheric blanket that surrounds the 
earth, trapping in more heat; 11 as a result, it has been 
argued that average global temperature may rise - a 
phenomenon also known as global warming. 11160 
In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
( IPCC) estimated that a doubling of atmospheric 
concentrations, calculated in terms of C02 with other 
greenhouse gases, the earth's average temperature would 
Bothwell, 100 
rise by 2.7 to 8.1 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100, or 
about O. 5 degrees per decade. 161 Fol lowing the I PCC' s 
announcement, climate change became a major political 
issue. Environmentalists began to suggest that "a series 
of scientific conferences during the 1980s built up a 
consensus that human emission of C02 and other gases would 
lead to a warming of the earth's surface, with associated 
climatic changes that could produce substantial 
detrimental effects on human society." 162 Further, 
following publicity stating the decade of the 1980s was 
the hottest on record, the idea of global warming started 
to appear plausible. 163 
Subsequent Environmentalist literature indicated that 
"the major consequences of the phenomenon (global warming) 
would include flooding of coastal plains as a result of 
the Arctic and Antarctic icecaps melting, drought, mass 
extinction of flora and fauna, and economic 
dislocation." 164 Environmentalists further argue that it 
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is "extremely dangerous to continue interference with the 
basic planetary system of heat balance, at an ever-
increasing pace, when the consequences are unknown. 11165 And 
they are concerned that "by the time the impacts are 
clearly visible, it will be far too late to avoid 
extensive further changes over subsequent decades. 11166 
However, if such a phenomenon is occurring, it seems 
states are far less convinced than Environmentalists of 
the severity of the problem; "policymakers in many 
countries see little reason to take difficult or costly 
actions to avert an unknown and perhaps distant risk. 11167 
This attitude, in terms of the conceptual model, is 
indicative of states' perception of scientific, economic 
and political uncertainty over global warming. 
Scientific Uncertainty as an Inhibitor 
Translated into policy directives, scientific 
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uncertainty inhibits state motivation and stifles state 
participation. Therefore, despite early Environmentalist 
statements like: 
Our present knowledge gives us confidence to predict 
the forthcoming increase in global mean surf ace 
temperature by several degrees over the next century 
caused by increasing levels of atmospheric C02 and 
other greenhouse gases due to human activity, 168 
these assertions are not borne out by the subsequent 
actions of states. Hence, one can conclude that states 
either do not agree with the Environmentalist prediction 
of increased global warming, or do not consider that 
prediction to be sufficient cause for action. In the case 
of global warming, there seem to be several major 
objections to global policy implementation. Despite 
initial optimism for the development of a multilateral 
agreement modeled after the Vienna Convention on Ozone 
Depletion169 , a framework treaty on global warming 
continues to be hindered. Why? It appears states do not 
exhibit concrete recognition that global warming is a 
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predicament mandating a global initiative. Specifically, 
states have been ambivalent over whether there is a 
problem, and consequently whether there is a need for 
action. 170 In fact, "the most striking distinction between 
climate change and other environmental concerns is that 
the actuality of global warming is not only distant in 
time but fraught with uncertainty as to its probable 
extent and consequences." 171 
Because of this explanation, the presence of scientific 
certainty is a crucial precondition for cooperation on 
global warming; "international cooperation will remain 
elusive as long as there is a disagreement about the issue 
being discussed." 1 72 The extent to which the actors hold 
a common perception, interpretation, and understanding of 
the problem is directly related to the extent of 
international participation, as this lessens 
uncertainty. 173 In short, scientific uncertainty is 
perhaps the greatest obstacle to date impeding progress on 
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any global warming problem-solving policy. Emphasis on 
research designed to increase knowledge of climate and to 
narrow uncertainties is necessary before any strong policy 
response can be undertaken. 174 Although this stand is 
frustrating to Environmentalists, it is in keeping with 
the traditional cost-benefit analysis employed by rational 
policymakers, who tend to adopt a wait-and-see attitude 
before incurring costs in the face of uncertain outcomes. 
Although attempts have been· made to draw a correlation 
between the successful ozone depletion issue and global 
warming, this issue linkage has yet to materialize. The 
Vienna Convention and subsequent Montreal Protocol and 
London Amendments were a reflection of policymakers' 
increasing certainty over scientific facts regarding ozone 
depletion and CFCs as a major cause of that dissipation. 
The original theory that implicated CFCs was postulated by 
Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina in 1974. 175 During the 
1970s, data collected had significant margins of error 
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attached, which were so wide that countries could not 
consider them reliable . 176 In fact, this theory was not 
accepted until as late as 1987; in the interim, 
uncertainty played a major role in preventing consensus. 177 
The discovery of a significant hole in the ozone layer 
over the Antarctic in 1985 by the British Antarctic Survey 
determined that the issue of ozone depletion was a 
definite reality . 178 Further, the graphic nature of an 
atmospheric hole acted as catalyst to policymakers in the 
face of a perceived threat to national and economic 
security. 179 By the advent of the Montreal Protocol in 
1987, the level of awareness regarding the rate of ozone 
depletion had greatly increased. Furthermore, new 
scientific reports over the rate of ozone depletion had 
created a sense of urgency not present at the 1985 
Convention: 
These reports were important because they 
demonstrated a strong consensus among scientists and 
policymakers that the ozone depletion problem was 
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real, that it was global in scope, and that society 
would have to deal with the environmental and health 
effects of ozone depletion for decades if not 
centuries. 180 
However, despite the evidence of ozone depletion, the 
causal link between CFCs and ozone depletion still 
remained elusive. Three contending theories the CFC 
theory, a natural or dynamic theory, and the solar or odd-
nitrogen theory - were popular with different segments of 
the scientific community . 181 The NASA expedition in 1987 
resulted in the finding that the destruction of ozone was 
undoubtably caused by a chemical source of atmospheric 
chlorine, verifying the CFC theory. 182 
Finally, with the cause of ozone depletion no longer a 
major point of contention, scientific information was 
considered more reliable for policymaking decisions to 
begin. 183 By the late 1980s, there was general acceptance 
both that CFCs caused the ozone hole over the Antarctic, 
and "that the destruction of the ozone layer would have 
Bothwell, 107 
serious global consequences." 184 These certainties spurred 
policymakers to negotiate initial problem-solving steps. 
Once consensus was reached, 80 countries agreed to cut out 
CFCs as soon as possible, with the year 2000 being the 
latest acceptable date. 185 The protocol was further 
strengthened by the 1990 London Amendment and again in 
1992 by the Copenhagen Amendment. Today developed states 
are required to phaseout all CFC use by January 1, 1996, 
while developing nations have until 2010 to complete their 
phaseout. 186 
Scientific accord was instrumental in achieving state 
participation on the ozone treaty, and "it is clear the 
scientific consensus on the seriousness of ozone 
stratospheric depletion and the link with CFCs was a major 
element in creating conditions for the conclusion of the 
Montreal Protocol. "187 According to Peter M. Haas, this is 
one manner in which Environmentalists, especially those 
from the scientific community, can help move along the 
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environmental problem-solving process. As demonstrated in 
the ozone depletion issue: 
"the successful coordination of national policies to 
protect the ozone layer was strongly influenced by 
the activities of an ecological "epistemic 
community," a knowledge-based network of specialists 
who shared beliefs in cause-and-effect relations, 
validity tests, and underlying principled values and 
pursued common policy goals. 11188 
Therefore, scientists can have a great impact on the 
environmental decision-making process, by eliminating 
problems associated with a vague interpretation of 
environmental issues, they have the ability to guide 
states toward that process. 189 The impetus for 
participation on the ozone depletion issue might have been 
significantly lowered had policymakers been presented with 
less evidence of scientific consensus regarding the 
dangers of ozone depletion; less comprehensive issues such 
as the acid rain debate may owe lack of state 
participation to poor problem definition. Further, if 
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there is an absence of consensus amongst the scientific 
community regarding the environmental issue, perhaps the 
problem cannot even be politically addressed. 
In such cases, Environmentalists should examine their 
appeal for these objections and determine the best 
interest-based approach for gaining state participation. 
The Montreal Protocol's learning package "illustrates the 
need to build a strong consensus within the scientific 
community on the nature and scope of the problem as a 
foundation from which to build substantive policy 
measures. "190 In particular, there must be scientific 
consensus regarding the problem and a need for action. 191 
Ultimately, "if the scientific community is split on an 
issue, substantive international action is unlikely. "192 
In terms of the conceptual model, the lack of scientific 
agreement not only fails to provide a motivator for 
international cooperation, but introduces an inhibitor. 
The fact that only twenty years ago scientists were 
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convinced the world was headed for another ice age 193 has 
naturally caused policymakers to remain skeptical about 
global warming in the absence of concrete proof. Although 
there is apparently some evidence to suggest a general 
warming trend, the causal link between greenhouse gas 
emissions and temperature increases has yet to be 
conclusively established. 194 Although, "it is tempting to 
attribute the [0.5 degree centigrade warming of the past 
100 years] to the increase in greenhouse gases. Because 
of the natural variation of temperature, however, such an 
attribution cannot now be made with any degree of 
confidence . " 195 And though the theory upon which the 
greenhouse phenomenon is based is accepted by a large 
portion of the scientific community, there are those who 
suggest that the temperature change could be a result of 
variations in solar output. 196 Further, others argue that 
the effects of alterations in the earth's orbital pattern 
may be having an effect on the planet's temperature, or, 
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that it may simply be that temperature fluctuations are a 
reflection of a high noise to signal ratio. 197 Scientists 
have admitted that, "it will be at least 10 years before 
anyone will be uncategorically certain that we are 
experiencing greenhouse-induced global warming." 198 
Foiled policy attempts instigated largely by 
Environmentalists mark continued lack of progress on 
global warming problem-solving. Although the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June, 1992 established a limited 
framework convention to address climate change, it was not 
considered successful in terms of generating policy 
options to address what states only see as a potential 
problem. The Rio Conference was scheduled to establish 
what was dubbed the Precautionary Principle. This 
Principle held various formulations; "at the one extreme 
it meant that if there was a possible environmental 
problem not yet fully confirmed by science, one should 
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come down in favor of the environment in choosing among 
various policy options. At the other extreme, it was held 
to mean that if there was any chance of environmental 
degradation, one must act to cut off this possibility, 
even if the science was weak and the costs were 
potentially very high." 199 Further progress is doubtful, 
despite continued Environmentalist warnings of 
catastrophic consequences. If scientific uncertainty were 
diminished in the next few years, it is possible that 
states could begin to negotiate incremental policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, the global 
warming issue is complicated by additional forms of 
uncertainty which contribute to state reluctance in 
developing problem-solving policies. 
Economic Uncertainty as an Inhibitor 
If global warming is determined to be a problem, then it 
is also associated with great costs to states. This 
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deterrent exists because the human-emitted sources of 
greenhouse gases are related to highly valued activities 
such as industrial and convenience uses. For example, 
many scientists state that "the dominant factor 
determining the build-up of carbon dioxide in the decades 
ahead, is the rate of burning of fossil fuels." 200 Of the 
greenhouse gases created by human activities, C02 is 
thought to be the largest contributor and the most 
exacting for states to reduce or eliminate. Economically 
and politically, eliminating its usage is a far more 
difficult problem than was abolishing CFCs for the ozone 
treaty. 
chemical 
CFCs are both non-critical for many industrial 
operations, and are replaceable through 
substitute compounds. 201 The development of substitutes 
lowered the costs of state participation considerably; by 
looking at the history of the ozone layer depletion issue, 
it is clear that the cost of banning CFCs without 
substitutes was not acceptable to national governments, 
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but the cost of the CFC ban with substitute chemicals, 
was, finally, acceptable. 202 It seems, therefore that 
states may have been willing to cooperate on the ozone 
depletion issue only if substitute chemicals for CFCs were 
made available. 203 Lessening C02 emissions appears to 
involve a complete re-tooling of existing industrial 
infrastructure and the development of unknown 
alternatives; these steps are not likely to be found 
acceptable to states. Therefore a pivotal distinction 
between the ozone depletion issue and global warming 
compounding the problem of existent scientific uncertainty 
is the "fact that the ozone depletion problem is more 
manageable that the global warming issue. 204 
Perceived economic uncertainty is a result of the high 
costs associated with state participation in plans for 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. State 
participation in the problem-solving process is further 
complicated by the astonishing variety of daily activities 
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which are thought to contribute to the generation of 
greenhouse gases, e.g. wood fires, dairy farming, rice 
growing, power generation, air travel and grass burning 
are several examples. 205 Large economic dislocations are 
expected, by even the most conservative and non-coercive 
means of reducing the risk of global warming; it is 
inevitable, therefore, that industrial countries will 
resist constraints which impair their competitiveness and 
that developing countries will resist constraints which 
impair their growth. " 206 The fact that the U.S. is heavily 
dependent upon fossil fuels breeds "the perception, 
widespread in the U.S. administration and corporate 
sector, that the costs of reducing C02 emissions would be 
very high." 207 And, that C02 , the main contributor to 
projected atmospheric change,"comes predominantly from use 
of fossil fuel energy and from deforestation" does not 
bode well for planned reductions and subsequent treaty 
law. 20s Accordingly, the U.S. has resisted all 
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Environmentalist entreaties to participate: "the 
scientific uncertainties must be reduced before we commit 
the nation's economic future to drastic and potentially 
misplaced policy responses. 11209 Worse, U.S. participation 
is thought to be crucial to any comprehensive problem-
solving effort 210 , and a simple emissions freeze was found 
by the International Energy Agency to be an inadequate 
response because world energy use is expected to increase 
by 50% by the year 2005. 211 
In addition to the adoption of high-costs, the global 
warming issue would be exceedingly difficult to actually 
pursue given present policy alternatives. Current 
understandings of global warming cite many additional 
greenhouse gases as responsible for the warming effect. 
That methane, a naturally occurring greenhouse emission, 
is considered a large contributor, lS definitely 
problematic for states. Swamps and marshes are the 
biggest sources of methane, followed by rice growing and 
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cattle-raising just maintaining current levels of 
atmospheric methane is suggested will lead to increased 
global warming even with reductions in C02 emissions. 212 
Predictions such as the latter do not provide states with 
much impetus to address global warming. In the face of 
such formidable obstacles, the actions of states seem as 
though they would have limited effect. 
At present, "the gulf between the positions of various 
states appears too great to allow meaningful cooperation" 
on global warming. 213 The U.S. response is typical of a 
developed-state reaction to the high-risk policymaking 
decision global warming has required to date. In addition 
to defending its policy based upon uncertainties and 
perceived high costs, the U.S. "has argued that the Rio 
Convention was never intended to be more than a framework 
without significant commitments; questioned the sincerity 
of some of the OECD 'green alliance' targets and positions 
on resource transfers (in some cases with good reason); 
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and stressed the futility of OECD action set against 
potential long-term growth in developing country emissions 
and population." 214 
The typical developing state response is indicative of 
opposite needs. On the one hand, many developing countries 
may be more accepting of initial problem-solving steps on 
global warming; however, conversely they wish to protect 
their fledgling industries. A viable coalition on climate 
change, which would include both countries of the North 
and the South, would have to include commitments from the 
industrialized countries to stabilize, and probably begin 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions above existing 
agreements to phase-out CFCs; "this would be necessary 
both as a basic logical requirement in an abatement regime 
(given the current large disparities) and as a means of 
convincing developing countries of the sincerity of the 
industrialized countries involved. " 215 In summary, for 
most states the economic consequences of action on global 
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warming are at present at the negative end of the response 
continuum, which inhibits an international cooperation 
effort. 
Political Uncertainty as an Inhibitor 
The economic costs of state participation on global 
warming are only marginally off-set by ill-defined 
benefits. Further, the situation of limited gains is 
further aggravated by the absence of clear rewards for all 
participants 
uncertainty. 
which creates conditions of political 
Although for some states global warming is 
a vital issue since it could affect their very existence 
as states, "for others the issues associated with poverty, 
budget deficits or other traditional concerns are far more 
pressing. "216 In contrast with the Vienna Convention where 
states engaged in reciprocal agreements through a 
perceived equitable exchange, global warming holds 
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equivocal gains; "there are countries that might perceive 
themselves as potential beneficiaries of global 
warming. " 217 Some countries such as Canada and the former 
Soviet Union have a much cooler climate than the rest of 
the globe, and accordingly, they could increase their 
agricultural productivity through the evolution of longer 
and warmer growing seasons. 218 Others are concerned about 
the predictions of rising sea levels which could have a 
disastrous effect on their populations and economies. 219 
The perception of winners and losers does not auger well 
for the reduction of political uncertainty necessary to 
galvanize state participation on the global warming 
issue. 220 In fact, the idea that some countries will end-
up losers does not provide for an exchange, much less an 
even one. Furthermore, political uncertainty increases the 
North-South divide that has occurred in this and other 
environmental issues. The perception of problem-solving 
costs is universal, but global warming costs are different 
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for both the developed and the developing world; "in the 
industrial world the issue is one of economic cost, growth 
and comparative advantage; in the developing world the 
issue is more fundamental, entailing, delaying or even 
foregoing development." 221 These perceptions have caused 
political resistance to a global warming initiative, "the 
fallout has exacerbated North-South suspicions, and has 
aroused considerable domestic pressure, particularly in 
India, not to compromise on basic equity perceptions or 
'give in' to any Northern demands. " 222 Once again, the 
weight of political factors is toward the negative end of 
the action continuum, thus inhibiting multilateral 
participation. 
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IV. RESOLVING UNCERTAINTY: 
A State-Centric Approach 
The fact that environmental problem-solving can produce 
uncertainty requires states to utilize incremental 
policymaking which can gradually lead the actors involved 
from the negative to the positive end of the participation 
continuum. Constraints are existent upon the information-
processing capabilities of the actor leading to conditions 
of bounded rationality where states are unable to process 
all available information. 223 Because uncertainty 
constrains the cost-benefit analysis, 
maximize gains in the classic sense. 224 
actors cannot 
Actors cannot 
compile all the available information and all possible 
alternatives into a rational decision-making process, thus 
limitations are imposed both by the complexity and amount 
of the external information and the cognitive ability to 
absorb that which is presented. 225 Accordingly, actors 
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"satisfice," choosing rational alternatives which fall 
within a comfortable framework of alternatives which 
remain certain, 226 because "actors laboring under bounded 
rationality cannot calculate the costs and benefits of 
each alternative course of action on each issue. On the 
contrary, they need to simplify their own decision-making 
processes in order to function effectively at all. 11227 
Because of these constraints, the current condition of 
international environmental problem-solving should remain 
an evolutionary process; it is necessary to have an 
incremental means of developing awareness over the 
environmental issues which are to be addressed by the 
political actions of states. This phase is required for 
the evolution of problem recognition and facilitating the 
onset of a state-centric approach. Further, the emergent 
awareness of scientific data is based upon a cumulative 
progression of research, and must also be assimilated 
incrementally. Third, overcoming the objections of 
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members states which are initially struggling with a cost-
benefit analysis also requires incremental steps. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the development 
of effective environmental treaty law is a protracted 
process that can be expected to continue indefinitely. 228 
This evolution of regulation is not unusual in 
international policymaking; 22 9 rather, it should be 
expected as the natural outcome of an anarchic system in 
which Realist actors seek to maximize gains or utility. 230 
In a decision-making process where preference 
determination is complex, maximizing expected utility does 
not match the notion of maximizing gains set forth by 
Keohane. The introduction of an uncertain prospect 
generates "risk aversion." 231 This concept can be simply 
illustrated by a situation where State E must choose 
between A, an expected gain of x; B, an expected loss of 
q, and C, an expected gain of y, where x > y; despite the 
fact that the expected gain of the unsure prospect is 
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considerably larger than the secure C-gain, the "expected 
utility of the gamble is smaller than the utility of the 
expected outcome of the gamble. " 232 Thus, if risk aversion 
is employed in uncertain situations one can expect states 
to avoid risk in favor of reduced gains. Despite the fact 
that such a choice employed in decision-making processes 
is considered sub-optimal, the act of satisficing should 
not be utilized as justification for eliminating states 
from the problem-solving mechanism. 233 Rather, satisficing 
increasingly indicates that clear gains must be included 
in the Environmentalist appeal. This inclusion will 
decrease states uncertainty over optimal choice decisions, 
and increase the ability to determine policy preferences. 
Therefore, in order to prevent permanent solutions which 
are continuously "ill-fitting and scientifically 
uncertain," an evolutionary approach must be utilized. 234 
Although an on-going problem-solving mechanism is ill-
regarded by Environmentalists, it is mandated by the need 
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to increase state participation over time, and by the 
absence of other positive environmental problem-solving 
approaches. Further, Environmentalists may presume to 
know what the consequences will be when they propose 
regulation; complex ecologies have few simple causes or 
simple results, Environmentalist recommendations can 
result in new and unexpected side effects. 235 Therefore, 
immediate and stringent approaches may hold two 
considerable drawbacks; first, they certainly present 
obstacles to gaining state participation; second, they may 
create new and unexpected environmental problems. 
Because, "ecological interactions are myriad, beyond human 
cognition," 236 incrementalism remains a necessary part of 
generating conclusions that are "temporary, evolving, and 
continuously expanding and perfectible, rather than 
overarching and deductive as an optimal formula should 
be. 11237 However, the fact that a number of formal, 
international agreements have been reached shows that the 
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treaty route can be sufficiently speedy and flexible to 
cope with high levels of uncertainty. 238 For example, in 
response to the ozone depletion issue, the Montreal 
Protocol was a multilateral treaty of global magnitude and 
rapid response: it garnered support through the 
culmination of scientific data which illustrated the 
gravity of the problem and gained participation through a 
concrete message of danger to the member states; however, 
the actual process of problem recognition and policy 
implementation was incremental. 
The best way to facilitate this incremental problem-
sol ving mechanism is through the continued utilization of 
the Convention-Protocol process. Due to the difficulty in 
negotiating high-cost agreements on uncertain issues, the 
Convention-Protocol approach is the most effective 
strategy generating a progressive regulation process. As 
noted, this framework technique was successfully utilized 
on the ozone depletion issue. Despite the attempt made at 
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the 1985 Vienna Convention to negotiate a protocol 
controlling CFCs, the "effort failed primarily due to 
differing economic positions among the key parties. 11239 
Instead, a resolution was adopted calling for future 
negotiations on a CFC protocol. 240 This strategy was 
effective because it kept states at the negotiating table, 
while allowing objections to be overcome by incremental 
development of certainty. In terms of the model 
previously presented, the process moved the actors 
gradually along the continuum from resistance and inaction 
toward multilateral cooperation. As such, the much-touted 
Convention on Ozone Depletion was successful because it 
was a "product of an incremental policy process in which 
past decisions and actions formed the foundation upon 
which the Montreal Protocol was based. 11241 Further, the 
ozone depletion issue is exemplary of the ability of 
states to cooperate and develop a framework treaty which 
will allow for more stringent regulations once 
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uncertainties are resolved. 
As illustrated through this analysis, global warming is 
unlikely to engender state participation without a 
reduction in scientific, economic and political 
uncertainty. As an environmental issue, global warming 
lacks the perception of threat and the support of major 
actors due to the uncertainties present. 242 The presence 
of scientific certainty and improved economic and 
political outcomes, the p.roducts of both greater 
understanding of the problem and continuing negotiations, 
were critical to achieving agreement on the Montreal 
Protocol; this process has only begun on the global 
warming issue. 243 However, these drawbacks should not 
deter Environmentalists from attempting to gain state 
participation on that issue. What it does mean is that 
radical attempts to gain a rapid response will likely 
fail. The key, then, is that the "temporary formula 
should be so constructed so that it calls for its own 
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improvement and moves the process along." 244 Further, in 
order to cope with the progression of science, an 
evolutionary approach is required; scientific data and 
input on global issues need to be assembled and tested 
before the political decisions are made. 245 Environmental 
problems will continue to require flexible solutions, ones 
which are "subject to current up-dating and amendments to 
meet rapidly changing situations and scientific-
technological progress." 246 This statement is especially 
true of the global warming issue, due to the uncertainties 
described previously. 
Global warming is explicative of issues that states are 
reluctant to address due to lack of motivators and the 
anticipation of high costs. These problems can be 
overcome through the convention-protocol process and an 
incremental approach. Through the use of conventions, 
states have time to address key areas of scientific, 
economic and political uncertainty; more stringent 
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regulations can be implemented later through the use of 
protocols. As illustrated, this process was seen to be 
especially effective in implementing the global initiative 
on ozone depletion. Therefore, "the international 
community will have to build a similar framework of 
decisions and actions that will serve as a foundation on 
which to base a substantive international agreement on 
global warming. " 247 Because states vary as to where 
climate change fits into their political priorities, 
substantive policies on global warming are best approached 
through a process of incrementalism. In this way, the 
limited framework convention adopted at Rio is a positive 
step toward addressing global warming, because it 
represents a formal, international recognition of the 
problem and acts as an expression of concern. 248 
Therefore, although a proposed Global Law of the 
Atmosphere seems highly unlikely, lesser agreements which 
combine specific attainable goals with a process of 
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incrementalism offer hope for a problem-solving effort. 249 
Despite doomsday predictions about the ramifications of 
global warming, Environmentalists will certainly have a 
better chance of generating increased participation 
through an incremental state-centric approach, rather than 
through either continued pressure to adopt more stringent 
requirements than states are amenable to, or by not 
including states in their proposals. Global warming 
illustrates the significance of the absence of a 
comprehensive approach to environmental policymaking. As 
such, it is exemplary of the rift between Environmentalism 
and Realism, which hampers efforts to address 
comprehensive global environmental problem-solving. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
State participation in environmental problem-solving can 
and does occur. Despite Environmentalist accusations that 
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states do not address environmental issues, states have 
historically done so within the context of a rational 
cost-benefit analysis; thus, they have acted when it 
appeared rational and in their interest to do so, and have 
abstained or resisted such efforts when it did not. 
Gaining state participation may be evolutionary and take 
on an incremental approach because of the complexity of 
environmental problems and the uncertainty surrounding 
them. In order to generate state awareness, some 
uncertainty must be eliminated in order to foster problem 
recognition. Then, a state-centric consequence must be 
perceived or established to develop the need for state 
participation. This stage can most easily be obtained 
through the perception of threat to state interests, but 
can also be gained if the arrangement is uncomplicated and 
has little cost involved. Finally, sufficient self-
interest, the most difficult factor to develop, must be 
present to actually motivate state action. This stage is 
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easier to establish if there is a strong threat motivator 
combined with high levels of certainty and low perception 
of unequal costs (lack of reciprocity). The less the 
perception of threat, the greater the need for certainty 
of policymaking outcomes and shared distribution of costs. 
In terms of the model presented in this analysis, 
international cooperation requires that the participants 
be motivated sufficiently in terms of confirmed scientific 
threat, adequate economic incentives and concrete 
political gains. Awareness of these inhibitors and 
motivators are the means by which a state-centric approach 
can be developed and state participation in environmental 
problem-solving can be established and continued. 
Ignoring these factors will consign Environmentalist 
appeals to limited effectiveness, rarely motivating states 
to act on issues where significant objections exist. The 
addition of political theory to the suppositions of 
Environmentalism, allowing development of more realistic 
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strategies for tackling environmental problem-solving, 
would be more appropriate and effective than the current 
impasse between Environmentalists and Realists. It is 
hoped that the approach presented in this thesis is a 
helpful beginning. 
Future research is necessary for the development of a 
comprehensive theoretical approach to global environmental 
problem-solving. In particular, a greater study of 
individual issues in terms of potential inhibitors and 
motivators must be initiated in order to appeal more 
effectively to state interests in problem-solving efforts. 
Further study of the perception of costs and benefits in 
environmental problem- solving may also yield important 
insights into gaining state interest on specific issues. 
And, where objections to participation exist, increased 
development of methods of eliminating criticism must be 
instigated in order to obtain more favorable state 
responses. Further, an in-depth historical examination of 
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successful and unsuccessful environmental problem-solving 
efforts in relation to the action continuum used in this 
study would provide useful information for future attempts 
at cooperation. In addition, issue linkage studies could 
prove valuable in terms of minimizing the presence of 
inhibitors and gaining state confidence through past 
positive experiences. Finally, on issues which remain 
stymied due to a lack of participation, the development of 
alternative strategies would assist in gaining at least a 
limited response. For example, if a global warming 
initiative remains too costly for global state 
participation, encouragement of state inclusion in global 
warming research, one means of establishing certainty and 
minimizing costs, could be helpful in gaining future 
response. There is optimism for global environmental 
problem-solving. A rapprochement can be made between the 
appeals of Environmentalism and the realities of political 
structures best understood by Realism. The key lies in 
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the pursuit of a state-centric approach. 
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